FIGR — Earnings Review (Q4 FY25 / Q3 FY25 Detailed)

muji (CMF_muji) Date: 2026-02-22 Quarter: Q4 FY25 (preliminary, Feb 13) + Q3 FY25 (reported, Nov 2025) Position: Long FIGR 4.7% Atlas baseline: ~/.agents/skills/atlas/analyses/FIGR/FIGR_earnings-review_Q4_FY25.md



Revenue

| | Q124 | Q224 | Q324 | Q424 | Q125 | Q225 | Q325 | Q425 | | | Mar-24 | Jun-24 | Sep-24 | Dec-24 | Mar-25 | Jun-25 | Sep-25 | Dec-25 | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Revenue ($m) | 75.3 | 80.8 | 101.0 | 83.9 | 84.5 | 106.1 | 156.4 | ~160 | | YoY % | — | — | — | — | 12.3% | 31.4% | 54.8% | 90.8% | | QoQ % | — | 7.3% | 25.1% | -17.0% | 0.8% | 25.5% | 47.4% | 2.3% |

Trajectory: 12% → 31% → 55% → 91% ^^

That's 4 consecutive quarters of accelerating YoY growth. Marketplace volume is the leading indicator and it's growing 131% YoY — faster than revenue, which means the monetization flywheel hasn't even fully engaged yet.


Platform Assessment — The muji Layer

Here's the thing: most analysts are covering FIGR as a fintech lender. That framing misses the thesis.

FIGR is a multi-layer blockchain-native capital markets infrastructure platform. Stack it out:

Layer Product Status muji Signal
Infrastructure Provenance Blockchain Live, 75% RWA market share The moat. Picks and shovels.
AI/Credit DART (Decisive AI Ratings Tool) 91% adoption, 76 lenders Crowdsourced intelligence ^^
Marketplace Figure Connect $1.13B volume, 33 participants Breakout. $0 → 26% of revenue in 9 months !!
Settlement/Liquidity YLDS stablecoin $376M circulation, +15% MoM Early but compounding
Origination HELOC, Democratized Prime #1 non-bank HELOC Top of funnel. Feeds everything above.

This is a building block platform, not a process tool. Lenders aren't using Figure because they have to — they're embedding Figure's infrastructure (DART, Provenance tokenization, Figure Connect) into their own workflows because it makes them money. When your customers grow, you grow. That's the compounding model.

DART is the crowdsourced intelligence angle. 76 lenders feeding credit decisions through DART means 76 lenders improving the model for everyone else. More participants → better credit model → better loan pricing → more participants. Classic compounding data moat. 91% adoption isn't just impressive — it means the network has already achieved critical density.


Revenue Quality Shift — This Is the Signal

Revenue Stream Q3'24 Q3'25 YoY Quality
Ecosystem & Tech Fees $7.3M $35.7M +388% !! HIGH — recurring, platform
Gains on Sale of Loans $57.1M $63.6M +11% LOW — lumpy, rate-sensitive
Interest Income $12.8M $17.9M +40% MEDIUM — portfolio yield
Origination Fees $19.0M $21.4M +13% MEDIUM — volume-driven
Servicing Fees $6.5M $7.9M +22% MEDIUM — portfolio-based

NUANCE: The headline 55% revenue growth is real, but the composition shift is the actual story. Ecosystem & Tech Fees — the highest-quality, most recurring, platform-native revenue — grew 5x YoY and jumped from ~7% to 23% of total. This is Figure Connect monetizing. Every quarter this mix shifts further toward fees and away from Gains on Sale, the multiple expands. We're watching a fintech transform from lender-economics to platform-economics in real time.


Profitability

| | Q324 | Q424 | Q325 | Q425 | | | Sep-24 | Dec-24 | Sep-25 | Dec-25 | |---|---|---|---|---| | EBITDA ($m) | 49.4 | 15.4 | 86.4 | 81.5 | | EBITDA Margin % | 44.9% | 20.2% | **55.4%** !! | ~51% | | Net Income ($m) | 27.4 | 5.9 | 89.8* | 13.0 | | Net Margin % | 27.1% | 7.0% | 57.4%* | 8.1% |

*Q3 net income inflated by IPO-related items. Q4 net income depressed by $40M SBC.

Use EBITDA as the clean signal: 51-55% EBITDA margins while growing 91%. You almost never see this combination. The margin expansion from (5.6%) EBITDA in FY23 to ~49% in FY25 in 2 years is !! extraordinary.

FCF margin (9.6% in 9M'25) is lower because lending platforms consume working capital. EBITDA > FCF is expected and not a red flag here — the lending model has inherent asset-funding dynamics.


Leading Indicators

Indicator Q3'25 Q4'25 Trend Signal
Marketplace Volume $2.47B $2.71B +131% YoY ^^ Bullish
YLDS Balance $100M $328M +228% QoQ !!
Ecosystem & Tech Fees $35.7M ~$45.7M (est) +388% YoY ^^ Leading revenue quality
Jan'26 Volume $816M/mo +115% YoY Sustained momentum
Active Partners 246 200 -19% QoQ !! RED FLAG — need Feb 26 answer
DART Adoption 91% Near-full adoption Platform lock-in
Connect Participants 33 Early but growing Building block adoption

The active partner decline (246 → 200) is the one thing I'm watching closely. A platform should not be losing partners. Possible explanations: seasonal inactivity, platform consolidation, higher quality partners replacing lower quality. Management MUST address this on Feb 26. If this is partner churn, that's a red flag on the network effects thesis.


NUANCE Section

What the market misses:

  1. DART at 91% is a moat, not just a metric. 76 lenders have built their credit decisioning around DART. Switching cost = re-underwriting entire loan book with a different model. This is Salesforce-level switching cost in a lending context.

  2. Figure Connect is the real growth engine. It went from $0 to 26% of revenue in 9 months and the monetization is just beginning. 33 participants on the blockchain marketplace vs 200 on the traditional platform = massive headroom. Every traditional partner that migrates to Figure Connect is revenue upside.

  3. YLDS as the moat amplifier. A $376M stablecoin circulating on Provenance Blockchain creates settlement velocity for the entire ecosystem. More YLDS → faster settlement → cheaper capital → more origination. This is the flywheel most people aren't modeling.

  4. The valuation is temporarily distorted by IPO recency. At $29.13, this is 7.5x TTM revenue on 91% YoY growth. If Atlas's consensus PT of $60 is right (9 analysts, avg Buy), the market hasn't priced in the platform layer yet. The 6-month lockup expiry is probably suppressing price — expect re-rating after.

  5. Mike Cagney. IMHO this is real but overweighted as a risk. He built SoFi (now a $7B public company) before the scandal. The Board has Tannenbaum as CEO. Cagney is Exec Chairman. Relevant to position sizing, not to the thesis.


The Anti-Thesis (steelman)

Trust but verify — let me give the bear case its due:

Customer concentration is the thesis-killer if true. Top 2 customers = 76% of UPB purchased. If this is a "platform" with 200+ partners, why does 76% flow through 2 buyers? This suggests the marketplace liquidity is more concentrated than the partner count implies. A true liquid marketplace would not have this concentration. If those 2 buyers pull back (rate decision, balance sheet constraints, counterparty risk), volume collapses.

SBC $40M in Q4 alone. That's 64% of FY25 total SBC in one quarter. Either this is IPO-grant normalization (one-time, manageable) or it signals a compensation structure that will persistently dilute equity holders. Feb 26 call must give a run-rate number.

HELOC is rate-cyclical. When rates rise, origination falls. Figure's #1 non-bank HELOC position is a strong competitive moat but not a recession hedge. In a rate-rising environment, Gains on Sale and Origination Fees (55% of Q3 revenue combined) compress. The Ecosystem & Tech Fee shift is the structural answer — but it's still 23% of revenue, not 60%.


Q3 Earnings CC Quotes

No transcript available. This is a significant data gap. I'm working off press releases only. The Feb 26 call (Q4 full results) will be the first full transcript I can analyze. Priority questions for that call:

  1. Active partner count decline: 246 → 200. Why? Churn vs inactivity?
  2. SBC run-rate: Is $40M in Q4 the new normal or a one-time IPO grant clearing?
  3. FY26 guidance: Will they provide targets?
  4. Figure Connect pipeline: How many traditional partners converting to blockchain?
  5. Customer concentration: Trend direction on top-2 as % of UPB?

My Stance

Tier 1 (modified). Current position: 4.7%. I would size to 7-8% post Feb 26 if:

The thesis in one sentence: FIGR is building the Stripe of capital markets on a blockchain-native infrastructure layer, with an AI credit moat (DART), a marketplace monetization engine (Figure Connect), and a stablecoin amplifier (YLDS) — all while growing 91% YoY at 51% EBITDA margins and trading at 7.5x revenue.

Risk that kills the thesis: Customer concentration proves the "marketplace" is actually a bilateral arrangement with 2 large buyers dressed up as a platform. Feb 26 must answer this.

My stance: Hold 4.7%. Add to 7-8% on Feb 26 confirmation. Asymmetric setup — consensus $60 PT vs $29 current price, best growth-adjusted valuation in the portfolio.

-muji Long FIGR 4.7%