FIGR — Stock Analysis (March 2026)

Date: 2026-03-27 | WSM | Market cap: ~7.1B|* * Price : ** 32 | 52w range: 25–78

Verdict

FIGR is the cheapest growth story in my portfolio and the thesis is strengthening with every data point. Revenue accelerating 12% → 31% → 55% → 91% YoY across FY25, EBITDA margins at 52% on a trajectory to 60%+, marketplace volume growing 131% (faster than revenue), the platform shift is real (Figure Connect at 54% of volume), and you're paying 11x run-rate P/S — a growth-adjusted 0.12x — for all of it. Two management transparency concerns (SBC communication failure, data breach disclosure gap) keep this from being a no-brainer. But the numbers are screaming.

Action: Hold. Add aggressively on any pullback below $30.

The Numbers

Revenue Grid (8 Quarters)

| | Q124 | Q224 | Q324 | Q424 | Q125 | Q225 | Q325 | Q425 | | | Mar-24 | Jun-24 | Sep-24 | Dec-24 | Mar-25 | Jun-25 | Sep-25 | Dec-25 | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Revenue ($m) | 75.3 | 80.8 | 101.0 | 83.9 | 84.5 | 106.1 | 156.4 | 159.9 | | QoQ % | — | 7.3% | 25.1% | -17.0% | 0.8% | 25.5% | 47.4% | 2.3% | | YoY % | — | — | — | — | 12.3% | 31.4% | 54.8% | 90.8% |

QoQ Seasonality Grid — The Critical Read

This is the chart that matters. Q4 is FIGR's seasonally weakest quarter (winter HELOC originations drop). In FY24, Q4 was -17% QoQ. In FY25, Q4 was +2.3% QoQ — a 19pp seasonal improvement. Figure Connect is dampening the lending cycle. The flat-looking sequential number isn't stalling; it's a structural improvement vs seasonality.

Revenue Composition — Where the Story Is

The thesis in one table: Ecosystem & tech fees (platform revenue) went from 10% to 26% of revenue in one year, and drove 43% of incremental YoY revenue growth. This is the highest-quality, most recurring, most capital-light line in the P&L. It grew +388% YoY. Everything else is growing too, but the mix shift toward platform economics is the transformation story.

Profitability

| | Q324 | Q424 | Q325 | Q425 | | | Sep-24 | Dec-24 | Sep-25 | Dec-25 | |---|---|---|---|---| | Adj EBITDA (m)|49.4|15.4|86.4|* * 81.3 * *||AdjEBITDAMargin|44.9|GAAPOpIncome(m) | 26.1 | -0.8 | 52.7 | 29.0 | | GAAP Op Margin | 25.8% | -1.0% | 33.7% | 18.1% | | Net Income (m)|27.4|5.9|89.8 * |* * 15.1 * *||SBC(m) | 4.5 | 4.2 | 17.5 | 40.2 |

*Q3 net income includes $31.5m one-time tax benefit.

Read EBITDA, not GAAP operating income, for Q4. The $40.2m SBC was a one-time event (IPO-related advisor grants + graded vesting acceleration). Management guided 21m/Qrun − rateforward.AtnormalisedSBC, Q4operatingincomewouldhavebeen 48m (30% margin). EBITDA at 52% on 91% growth → Rule of 40 = 143. Exceptional.

Annuals — FY24 vs FY25

Leading Indicators — Bullish Divergence Confirmed

This is where the alpha signal lives. My framework says: when revenue is steady but 2+ leading indicators are accelerating, the market is underpricing future growth. FIGR has this pattern in spades.

Every leading indicator is growing faster than headline revenue. Marketplace volume (+132% YoY) exceeds revenue growth (+91% YoY) by 41pp. That divergence doesn't persist — it resolves as revenue catches up. The partner growth (307, +25% QoQ) is the pipeline for that catch-up: each new partner ramps over ~3 months and then scales.

One flag inside the leading indicators: Net take rate compressed from 4.4% to 3.8% QoQ. This is within the 3.5-4.0% guidance range and is explained by mix shift (Connect carries a lower take rate but higher EBITDA margins). It's a feature of the model evolution, not competitive pressure. But if it drops below 3.5%, the revenue-per-volume arithmetic breaks.

Platform Transformation — The Real Thesis

The market still prices FIGR partly as a lending company. It's becoming a capital markets infrastructure platform. The evidence:

Figure Connect: Capital-Light Flywheel

Connect is a whole-loan marketplace where originators sell to institutional buyers. FIGR doesn't take balance sheet risk on these transactions — it earns ecosystem/tech fees for matching. When Connect went from 0% to 54% of volume in 18 months, the business model shifted from "lend and sell" to "facilitate and fee." That's why EBITDA margins went from 20% to 52% in the same period.

New Verticals Launching

Each new vertical broadens the TAM, reduces HELOC concentration, and feeds volume through the same platform infrastructure. Auto alone is a $1.5T outstanding market. First-lien is $15T. These aren't small adjacencies.

Blockchain Infrastructure — Optionality

I don't value this optionality in my base case, but it's real. If YLDS reaches $5B+ in circulation, the interest income alone becomes material. If OPEN enables 24/7 equity trading for even a handful of issuers, the infrastructure value transcends lending.

Valuation

Run-Rate Multiples (Latest Q × 4)

*Normalised: Replace $40.2m SBC with guided $21m, tax-adjust the difference.

Context

• Growth-adjusted P/S of 0.12x is the cheapest in my portfolio by a wide margin. Most SaaS names sit at 0.3-0.5x. FIGR trades like a legacy lender priced at a tech platform's growth rate.
• EV/EBITDA of 18x on 91% revenue growth and 148% EBITDA growth is remarkably cheap. Even at 40% growth deceleration next year, this is below-market for a fintech platform.
• Analyst PT spread: BofA $42 (bear) → Mizuho 45 → consensus 57 → Bernstein $72 → Piper $75. Stock at $32 trades 40-57% below the average target.
• $200m buyback at current price = ~2.8% of market cap. Management clearly thinks it's cheap too.

Seasonality Caveat

Q3 is FIGR's strongest quarter (origination season). Q4 has some seasonal moderation. Run-rate calculated on Q4 is reasonable — Q3 would overstate. I'm comfortable with the Q4 run-rate denominator.

Where It Gets Expensive

At 50/share( 10.8B market cap), run-rate P/S would be ~17x and growth-adjusted would be 0.19x — still cheaper than most of my portfolio. I wouldn't need to trim until growth decelerates AND the multiple re-rates above 20x P/S.

Management Assessment

The Good

• Tannenbaum (CEO) has delivered on every Q3 promise. Partners expanded, liquidity deepened, blockchain infrastructure advanced, OPEN launched. He's specific with numbers, concrete on strategy, and not overselling.
• Kgil (CFO) provides clear, detailed financial breakdowns. The contribution margin disclosure (~80%), take-rate walk, and SBC normalisation guidance were all helpful.
• Every Q3 FY25 promise tracked to delivery. See Promise Tracker. 4/4 confirmed.
• "Year of the first lien" is a specific, testable commitment. Good management makes falsifiable claims.
• $200m buyback at $34 → shareholder alignment.

The Concerning

Two transparency failures in the first two public quarters:

1. SBC spike not telegraphed. Q4 SBC of $40.2m (64% of FY total) was not mentioned in the February 13 preliminary release. It broke analyst models and caused a 27% single-day stock drop. Management should have flagged this in the prelim PR. The normalisation guidance on the call was clean, but the communication sequence was poor. This is a new public company learning investor relations — but in my framework, communication matters.

2. Data breach disclosure discrepancy. Management disclosed "approximately 12,400 customer records" affected by the February phishing attack. External reporting (TechCrunch, SecurityWeek, CrowdFund Insider) consistently cites ~967,000 records exposed. That's a 78x gap. No public reconciliation has been offered. This could be a definitional difference ("affected" vs "exposed"), but a company handling SSNs and home equity data needs to be precise about breach scope, not leave a material discrepancy open.

Neither is disqualifying on its own. Both are consistent with a newly-public company whose IR function hasn't matured. But together, they require that I verify management claims independently going forward rather than accepting them at face value. Trust but verify.

Cagney (Executive Chairman)

Background: SoFi co-founder, departed under sexual harassment allegations in 2017. Now Executive Chairman, not CEO. Absent from Q4 earnings call (White House commitment). Structurally separated from day-to-day operations. No new incidents. The risk is reputational, not operational. Monitoring, not actionable.

Scuttlebutt — What the Field Says

Customers: Very Strong

• Trustpilot: 4.8/5 stars, 4,493 reviews. 5-day HELOC funding, smooth digital close, named loan officers praised.
• Industry awards: Best Home Equity Lender (Money.com), Best HELOC (Investopedia), Highest Rated Home Equity Product (LendEDU) — all 2025/2026.
• Product nuance: Figure's "HELOC" actually functions more like a term loan (full deposit upfront, payoff closes the account). Sophisticated borrowers notice this. Not a service failure, but an expectation-setting gap.

Employees: Adequate

• Glassdoor: 3.9/5, 227 reviews, 72% recommend. Comp & benefits improving (4.0/5, up 23% YoY). Work-life 3.6/5.
• Negative signals: Management silos emerging, career progression unclear, outside hires for senior roles. Consistent with fast post-IPO scaling, not dysfunction.
• AI efficiency: 75% chat containment on AI customer service agent. Staff redeployed to growth. Operational leverage building.

Competitive Position: Dominant in Core, Early in Adjacencies

• #1 non-bank HELOC originator. Uncontested.
• 75% of tokenized private credit. Provenance Blockchain is the moat.
• First AAA-rated blockchain securitization. S&P and Moody's.
• Auto: First mover in blockchain-native auto loan tokenization via Agora. No direct competitor.
• Origination cost: <$1,000 in 5 days vs $11,045 industry average. If this holds at scale, it's a structural cost moat.

Institutional Flows

Mithril II (Thiel-backed) acquired 862K shares in March. JPMorgan $15.5m stake. Fidelity National $9.1m. Building institutional base for a recently-public name.

Risk Register

Prior Beliefs → Updated Beliefs

What I'm Watching — Q1 FY26 (May 2026)

Bottom Line

FIGR is a company transforming its revenue model in real time. The numbers confirm it: platform revenue (eco & tech fees) grew 388% YoY and now drives 43% of incremental growth. The lending marketplace volume (+131%) is growing faster than revenue (+91%), which is growing faster than the market gives credit for at 11x run-rate P/S.

The anti-thesis hinges on three things: (1) the business is still dependent on gain-on-sale revenue (30% of mix) which is inherently lumpy and rate-sensitive, (2) management has had two communication missteps in two public quarters (SBC, breach), and (3) customer concentration remains dangerously high at 76% in top-2.

None of those break the thesis today. But they keep the position at "hold/add on pullback" rather than "back up the truck."

The Q1 FY26 report in May is the next inflection point. If SBC normalises to ~$21m, take rate holds 3.5-4%, and revenue exceeds $150m, the growth-adjusted valuation gap will become untenable. The stock will re-rate.

Thesis: Strengthening. Conviction: High. The March data (Agora auto loans live, YLDS at $464m, institutional accumulation) adds confidence since my February review. The data breach disclosure gap is the only new negative, and it's a management communication issue, not a business deterioration.

At $32/share with 91% revenue growth, 52% EBITDA margins, and every leading indicator accelerating — you're being paid to wait.

-wsm

(Long FIGR, substantial position)

Sources:

• Q4 FY25 Full Press Release (EDGAR 8-K EX-99.1, Feb 26, 2026)
• Q4 FY25 Earnings Call Transcript (Motley Fool, Feb 26, 2026)
• Q3 FY25 10-Q (SEC EDGAR, Nov 13, 2025)
• Yahoo Finance: FIGR
• Macrotrends: FIGR Market Cap
• TechCrunch: Data Breach ~1M Customers
• Agora/FIGR Auto Loans On-Chain (Mar 26)
• Mizuho PT Cut (Mar 27)
• Atlas baseline analysis (Feb 21, 2026)
• WSM prior analyses: Q4 FY25 earnings review (Feb 27), Cantor re-eval (Mar 10)