Verdict: Beat-and-raise. Thesis intact and strengthening. Date: 2026-03-30 (updated with March 26 LPB expansion) Quarter: Q4 FY25 (Dec-2025) | ER: Jan 30, 2026 Price: 15.05(Mar29, 2026)|Marketcap: 19.6B | Shares: 1,346M Run-rate adj net revenue: $4.05B | FY26 guide: $4.655B (+30%) FY26 adj EPS guide: 0.60 → * * ForwardP/E : 25x * *|P/TBV : 2.15xEV: 16.5B (net cash $3.1B) | EV/Run-rate Rev: ~4.0x
SoFi just printed its first $1B revenue quarter, announced $3.6B in new LPB partnerships four days ago, and the stock is down 17% from its February high. That's the setup. $1,025M GAAP revenue (+39.6% YoY), $1,013M adjusted net revenue (+37% YoY), $318M EBITDA (31.4% margin — ATH), record 1M new members in a single quarter, and FY26 guidance of $4.655B / $0.60 EPS that the market has decided to ignore because of macro noise and a paywall change going live tomorrow. At $15.05, you're paying 25x forward earnings for a company guiding 30% revenue CAGR and 38-42% EPS CAGR through 2028. PEG < 0.7. The business is working. The stock is not. Those divergences don't last.
Post-earnings catalyst (March 26): SoFi announced 3.6BinnewLPBagreements—aleadingglobalbank(1B+), a financial services and insurance group ($600M/12 months), and a top-5 global private asset management firm (up to $2B over 2 years). This validates the LPB as a repeatable institutional franchise, not a one-off experiment. At $775M run-rate growing 3x YoY and now with $3.6B in new committed flow, LPB alone could be a $1.5B+ revenue business by end-2026.
| Quarter | FY22 QoQ | FY23 QoQ | FY24 QoQ | FY25 QoQ | Same-Q Delta (FY24→25) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | +21.4% | +11.4% | +20.1% | +10.7% | -9.4pp |
| Q2 | +9.7% | +5.5% | -7.2% | +10.8% | +18.0pp |
| Q3 | +17.0% | +7.9% | +16.5% | +12.5% | -4.0pp |
| Q4 | +7.7% | +14.6% | +5.3% | +6.6% | +1.3pp |
Q4 is seasonally the weakest sequential quarter for SoFi. Q4 FY22: +7.7%, Q4 FY24: +5.3%, Q4 FY25: +6.6%. The +6.6% looks anaemic in isolation but in context it's a +1.3pp improvement over the prior Q4. More importantly, Q2 FY25 improved by +18.0pp over Q2 FY24 (the prior year was distorted by mark-to-market). Applying the seasonal QoQ delta framework from my FIGR analysis: the delta improvement pattern across FY25 (+18.0pp Q2, -4.0pp Q3, +1.3pp Q4) averages +5.1pp — structural improvement dampening the seasonal cycle. Nuf said.
6.6% QoQ annualises to ~29%. Combined with the YoY trajectory:
| Quarter | FY22→23 | FY23→24 | FY24→25 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | +43.0% | +36.6% | +19.7% | Decelerating (but FY24 Q1 was inflated) |
| Q2 | +37.4% | +20.2% | +42.8% | Reaccelerated sharply |
| Q3 | +26.7% | +29.8% | +37.9% | Accelerating |
| Q4 | +34.7% | +19.3% | +39.6% | Reaccelerated sharply |
→ The FY25 trajectory is clear: reacceleration after the FY24 growth trough. Q2-Q4 FY25 all came in north of 37% YoY vs Q2-Q4 FY24 averaging ~23%. The story isn't "can they grow 30%?" — they've been growing 38-43% for three quarters. The guide is the floor.
| Q3_FY23 | Q4_FY23 | Q1_FY24 | Q2_FY24 | Q3_FY24 | Q4_FY24 | Q1_FY25 | Q2_FY25 | Q3_FY25 | Q4_FY25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adj Net Rev ($M) | 531 | 594 | 581 | 597 | 689 | 739 | 771 | 858 | 950 | 1,013 |
| YoY % | — | — | +9.5% | +12.6% | +30.0% | +24.4% | +32.7% | +43.7% | +37.7% | +37.0% |
| QoQ % | — | +11.9% | -2.2% | +2.8% | +15.4% | +7.2% | +4.3% | +11.3% | +10.7% | +6.7% |
| Q2_FY23 | Q4_FY23 | Q2_FY24 | Q4_FY24 | Q2_FY25 | Q4_FY25 | Direction | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross margin | 81.1% | 83.1% | 81.7% | 82.5% | 82.4% | 84.2% | ATH |
| EBITDA margin | 15.4% | 29.4% | 23.0% | 26.8% | 29.1% | 31.4% | ATH |
| Op margin (GAAP) | — | — | — | 8.2% | — | 18.1% | +9.9pp YoY |
| Net margin (adj) | — | — | — | 8.3% | 11.4% | 17.1% | Sequential improvement |
Incremental EBITDA margin: 44%. For every incremental dollar of revenue, $0.44 dropped to EBITDA. Operating leverage kicking in. Management guiding 34% EBITDA margin FY26, with trigger for expansion to 40%+ when revenue growth drops below 15%.
| Metric | My Expectation (Pre-ER) | Actual | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 adj net revenue | ~$965M (implied from FY guide) | $1,012.8M | +5.1% beat — material |
| EBITDA margin | ~30% | 31.4% | ATH; exceeded long-term 30% target |
| Members added Q4 | ~850K | 1,009K | First 1M+ quarter. Record. |
| Financial Services rev | ~$400-420M | $456.7M (+78% YoY) | Approaching lending. This is the story. |
| FY26 guide | ~$4.3-4.5B (consensus) | $4.655B / $0.60 EPS | Above high end. Record initial guide. |
| Credit quality | Stable | 2.80% charge-off (-50bps YoY) | Improving. Vintage data widening gap vs 2017 cohort. |
Delta: The magnitude of the beat was the surprise. Revenue 5% ahead of guide, EBITDA margin surpassing the long-term target, and FY26 guidance embedding another year of 30%+ growth with 34% EBITDA margins. Management just printed 38% and is guiding 30%. That's sandbagging. The FY25 guide accuracy (+1.4% beat on $3.54B) confirms conservative guidance philosophy.
| Q3_FY23 | Q4_FY23 | Q1_FY24 | Q2_FY24 | Q3_FY24 | Q4_FY24 | Q1_FY25 | Q2_FY25 | Q3_FY25 | Q4_FY25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FS ($M) | 118 | 139 | 151 | 176 | 238 | 257 | 303 | 363 | 420 | 457 |
| Lending ($M) | 349 | 353 | 331 | 341 | 396 | 418 | 413 | 444 | 493 | 499 |
| Tech ($M) | 90 | 97 | 94 | 95 | 103 | 103 | 103 | 110 | 115 | 122 |
| FS as % total | 21% | 24% | 26% | 29% | 32% | 33% | 39% | 39% | 44% | 45% |
Financial Services is one quarter from overtaking Lending as the largest segment. FS at $457M vs Lending at 499MGAAP(487M adj). At the current trajectory — FS growing 78% YoY vs Lending at 15-19% — the crossover happens in Q1 FY26. This is the re-rating trigger.
Applying Bear's learning on the lending-to-fee revenue mix shift: when fee revenue crosses ~50% of total, the appropriate valuation framework shifts from bank anchors (P/TBV, NIM) to platform multiples (P/S, forward P/E). SoFi is approaching this inflection — FY25 FS was $1,542M / total $3,613M = 43%. With FS guided 40%+ growth and Lending at 23%, the crossover to majority fee-revenue is a 2026 event. This changes SoFi's peer group from regional banks (1.5x P/TBV) to fintech platforms (3-5x P/TBV).
Why does this matter?
| Metric | Q4_FY25 | Post-Earnings Update (March 26) |
|---|---|---|
| LPB Revenue | $193.7M | — |
| LPB Ann. Run-Rate | $775M | Growing — $3.6B new commitments |
| LPB YoY Growth | +2.9x | — |
| LPB Origination Run-Rate | $15B | $3.65B/Q exit rate (Q4) |
| PL Originated for 3rd Parties | $3.7B | — |
The March 26 announcement changes the LPB narrative from "promising" to "proven franchise." Three new institutional partners — a leading global bank (1B+), afinancialservicesandinsurancegroup(600M over 12 months), and a top-5 global private asset management firm (up to $2B over 2 years) — committed $3.6B in aggregate personal loan delivery through SoFi's platform. This is capital-light, fee-based, recurring. Zero credit risk. Zero balance sheet consumption.
The LPB is a marketplace business embedded inside a bank. $775M annualised revenue growing 3x with zero credit risk. If LPB were a standalone company at this growth rate, it would command 10-15x revenue. It's buried inside a company trading at 4x EV/run-rate revenue. With $3.6B in new committed flow layered on top of existing partnerships, LPB is on a credible path to $1.5B+ annualised revenue by late 2026. That's 33% of the current market cap from a single business line with marketplace economics.
| Q4_FY24 | Q1_FY25 | Q2_FY25 | Q3_FY25 | Q4_FY25 | Trend | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lending | 58.9% | 57.8% | 55.2% | 53.0% | 54.5% | Stable (mix shift to home/student) |
| Financial Services | 44.8% | 48.9% | 51.9% | 53.8% | 50.5% | Expanding — converging with Lending |
| Technology Platform | 31.2% | 29.9% | 30.2% | 28.3% | 39.2% | Jump in Q4 (client transition fee?) |
Tech Platform: accounts dropped from 157.9M to 128.5M — large client departure. Revenue still grew 19% YoY and contribution margin spiked to 39%. Management deflected the baseline question on the call (yellow flag for transparency) but guided 20% growth FY26 excluding that client and assuming zero revenue from them. The Q4 margin spike likely includes a termination fee — watch Q1 FY26 margins normalise.
| Indicator | Q4_FY25 | YoY Change | Signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Members | 13.7M | +35% | Accelerating — first 1M+ adds quarter |
| Total products | 20.2M | +37% | Accelerating — faster than member growth |
| Cross-buy rate | 40% | +7pp | Record — existing members deepening |
| Rev per product | $104 (ann.) | +29% | Record — monetisation intensity rising |
| Deposits | $37.5B | +$11.5B (+44%) | Accelerating — 97% direct depositors |
| Fee-based revenue | $443M (44% of total) | +53% | Accelerating share |
| LPB revenue | $194M | +2.9x | New S-curve — scaling rapidly |
| LPB committed flow | $3.6B new (Mar 26) | New | Institutional validation |
| Brand awareness | 9.6% | +250bps (+33%) | Improving — <10% = massive runway |
| Originations | $10.5B | +46% | Record — first $10B+ quarter |
→ Multi-S-curve stacking. S-curve 1 (Lending) mature and profitable. S-curve 2 (Financial Services) in hypergrowth. S-curve 3 (LPB/marketplace) just validated by institutional commitments and tripling. S-curve 4 (Crypto/stablecoin) pre-revenue but strategically positioned as first national bank stablecoin issuer. Each at a different maturity. This warrants structural conviction over single-metric hedging.
Leading indicator divergence check: Members +35%, products +37%, revenue per product +29%, deposits +44%, fee revenue +53% — all growing faster or in-line with total revenue (+38% FY25). No negative divergence. This is the 2+ indicators accelerating for 2+ quarters pattern from my framework. When every leading indicator is at records while the stock drops 17%, the market is mispricing the forward trajectory.
| Metric | FY25 Guide | FY25 Actual | Beat |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adj Net Revenue | $3.54B | $3.591B | +$51M (+1.4%) |
| Adj EBITDA | $1.035B | $1.054B | +$19M (+1.8%) |
| Adj Net Income | $455M | $481.3M | +$26M (+5.8%) |
| Adj EPS | $0.37 | $0.38 | +$0.01 |
Beat on all four metrics. Conservative guide setter → credible forward estimates.
| Metric | FY26 Guide | Implied Growth |
|---|---|---|
| Adj Net Revenue | $4.655B | +30% YoY |
| Adj EBITDA | $1.6B | +52% / 34% margin |
| Adj Net Income | $825M | +71% / 18% margin |
| Adj EPS | $0.60 | +58% |
| Member Growth | 30%+ | ~17.7M+ by year-end |
Medium-term (2025-2028): Revenue CAGR 30%+, EPS CAGR 38-42%.
Segment FY26 guide: FS >=40% | Lending ~23% | Tech ~20% (ex-transitioned client).
Q1 FY26 guide: ~1.04Badjnetrevenue(+35300M EBITDA (29% margin), ~$0.12 EPS. Seasonal payroll taxes and front-loaded marketing in H1 depress margins vs Q4 — this is normal.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price | $15.05 |
| Market cap | ~$19.6B |
| EV (net of $3.1B cash) | ~$16.5B |
| EV/Run-rate Revenue | 4.0x |
| EV/FY26 Revenue | 3.5x |
| Forward P/E (FY26) | 25x |
| PEG Ratio | 0.60-0.66 |
| P/TBV | 2.15x |
| FY28E EPS (~$1.05-1.20) | 12.5-14.3x implied P/E |
PEG < 0.7 with 38-42% EPS CAGR is one of the more compelling GARP setups available. Stock down 17% from February high and 26% from 52-week high on macro noise, not fundamentals.
Peer context: Nu Holdings (analogous consumer fintech, ~50% growth) trades at ~10x P/S and ~35x forward P/E. SoFi at 4x EV/Rev and 25x forward P/E with 30%+ growth and improving margins is trading at a meaningful discount to the closest comparable. The PEG cross-check (P/S 4.0x / 30% growth = 0.13) vs Nu (~10x / 50% = 0.20) confirms SoFi is cheaper on a growth-adjusted basis.
FY28 math: If management hits the CAGR targets — 0.60FY26x1.402= 1.18 FY28 EPS. At 25x = $29.50 (96% upside). At 20x = $23.60 (57% upside). Even at a punitive 15x = $17.70 (18% upside). Downside protection from TBV floor: $7.01/share growing 30%+ annually.
Live March 31, 2026. $10/month replaces free tier previously available with direct deposit.
Refined assessment using Phil's paywall-math check: Without Plus, DD members retain 3.6% APY. With Plus: 4.5% APY. The incremental 0.9% on $20K = $180/year vs $120 cost = net positive for members with $20K+ balances. However, Doctor of Credit correctly notes the market-relative math: best competing rate is 4.25%, so the switching delta is only 0.25% = $50 on $20K, which doesn't cover $120. The value works for multi-product members (2% IRA match, 5% grocery cashback on Smart Card, loan discounts) — precisely the 40% cross-buy cohort. For deposit-only members, the value math is negative.
Net assessment: Low-to-medium risk. SoFi's critical mass is the multi-product relationship — the cross-buy cohort won't churn over $10/month. Single-product deposit-only users may leave, but they're the lowest-value members. The real watch is whether Q1-Q2 member additions and products-per-member show any discontinuity. Management's decision not to address this on the Q4 call remains a yellow flag.
PL charge-off 2.80%, down 50bps YoY. Vintage data: Q4'22-Q1'25 cohorts at 4.55% cumulative loss with 37% UPB remaining, well below 6.27% for 2017 vintage at same point. Gap widening for 6 consecutive quarters. FICO 746, income $158K. Improving, but macro deterioration could stress even prime cohorts.
+17% YoY from 1.5Bequityraise.ButTBV/share + 574.47 to $7.01) — the raise was accretive to book value. Capital ratio 22.9% (2x+ regulatory min). Warehouse lines fully paid down. No near-term need for further raises. SBC declining as % of revenue: $262M FY25 / $3,613M = 7.3%.
NIM 5.72%, guided above 5%. Management assumes 2 Fed cuts in 2026 (exit rate 3.0-3.25%). LPB/FS growth deliberately reducing rate sensitivity in revenue mix — fee revenue growing from 37% to 44% of total in one year.
128.5M accounts from 157.9M — single client drove the decline. Revenue still grew 19%. Contribution margin expanded. Management deflected baseline question (yellow flag). But guided 20% growth ex-client with zero assumed revenue. If they hit that, the noise disappears.
5/5 boxes checked. The March 26 LPB announcement adds a fifth dimension: external institutional validation from a global bank, an insurance group, and a top-5 asset manager. These aren't retail investors — they're doing their own due diligence and committing billions. That's a conviction signal.
Not in the core thesis, but worth tracking as a free option:
The bank charter creates a regulatory moat — charter-less competitors cannot replicate these products without the years-long approval process. Pre-revenue but strategically positioned. Noto's "couldn't be more excited" language on crypto (used 3x on call) signals management commitment.
SoFi is a multi-S-curve financial platform transforming from rate-dependent lender to diversified fee-generating platform, at a price that values it like a struggling bank.
Three pillars:
Updated catalysts post-March 26:
Thesis status: Strengthening. Action: Initiate position / Add on weakness (5-7% starter).
What I need to see Q1 FY26:
-wsm
(Not long SOFI — initiating coverage for potential position)
Sources: Q4 FY25 earnings PR (Jan 30, 2026), earnings call transcript (Motley Fool), $3.6B LPB expansion PR (BusinessWire, Mar 26, 2026), Doctor of Credit SoFi Plus analysis, Atlas baseline analysis (Feb 23, 2026), Bear/Phil prior learnings on mix shift and paywall math.